



The history of American administrative law consists in large part of a
game of procedural catch-up. Courts and legislatures attempted to control
agencies' autonomy only after agencies came to wield substantive author-
ity. This tardiness stemmed initially from the fundamental antipathy of
Anglo-American jurisprudence to administrative law: Allegiance to the
"rule of law" demanded that government officers be subject not to special
rules invented for their benefit but to the same common law rules that
governed private persons.1 This attitude finally crumbled under the
weight of the New Deal's administrative activity. A decade after the New
Deal had endowed the agencies with vast substantive power, Congress
provided procedural rules for the exercise of that power in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA).2
Because American administrative law represents such a tardy reaction,
it has never pretended to be a complete body of law. Most procedural
requirements are found in the variously worded and incomplete proce-
dural provisions tacked onto the organic acts that establish particular
agencies or programs.3 The APA is residual law for courts to use when
there are gaps in those organic procedural provisions.
Because the APA was meant to control the greatly expanded adjudica-
tory activities of regulatory agencies, it contains relatively detailed rules
for administrative adjudication, 4 but says little about other forms of ad-
ministrative action. In the three decades after passage of the APA, admin-
istrative agencies shifted increasingly from quasi-judicial adjudication to
quasi-legislative rulemaking as their primary way of making policy.' The
t Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley, School of Law.
I. See A. DICEY, INTRODUCTON TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 202-03
(1885); Shapiro, On Predicting the Future of Administrative Law, REGULATION, May/June 1982, at
18, 18-19.
2. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as APA].
3. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1982) (OSHA
judicial standards should be based on substantial evidence); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 153-168 (1982) (setting out National Labor Relations Board procedures).
4. See APA §§ 556-557 (provisions governing procedures to be followed in administrative
adjudications).
5. See Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965); see also Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking,
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APA contains only a few cryptic words about rulemaking: It requires only
that rules be made after "notice" and "submission of written data, views,
or arguments," be published in the Federal Register, and be accompanied
by a "concise general statement of their basis and purpose."' During the
1960's and 1970's, the courts, led by the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, caught up to the substantive reality of greatly increased rulemak-
ing by writing a detailed, judge-made code of administrative procedure for
rulemaking.7 Suitably winnowed, that case law seems likely to be incor-
porated into the revised APA that Congress will probably enact within the
next few years.
Now that the courts have caught up with adjudication and then with
rulemaking, what next? The APA essentially divides administrative action
into three parts: quasi-judicial adjudication; quasi-legislative rulemaking;
and a residual category, which I shall call "informal action." This Article
discusses the nature of administrative actions in this residuum. First, it
explores the "discovery" of administrative discretion and the courts' initial
articulation of standards of review for discretionary action. It then locates
the issue of judicial control of discretionary agency action in the larger
context of American political development. Finally, it examines the vari-
ous forms that discretion can take and speculates on the courts' possible
responses to these different types of agency behavior.
I. The Idea of Agency Discretion
A. Giving the Residuum a Name: Discovering Administrative Discretion
The APA sets up a strange gravitational attraction between the non-
adjudicative, non-rulemaking residuum and discretion. It provides no pro-
cedural rules for the residuum and no specific standards for judicial re-
view of informal actions. If courts are to review the residuum at all, they
cannot do so for its adherence to the procedures of section 553 or sections
556 and 557.1 Instead, they must look to the APA's general catchall stan-
dard of review. Courts may review any administrative action to determine
whether it was "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion."10 "Ar-
85 YALE L.J. 38, 38-39 (1975) (it was "generally assumed" until early 1960's that regulatory
schemes would rely primarily on adjudication).
6. APA § 553.
7. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 447-634 (2d ed. 1978).
8. The APA gave no name to this third category. Informal action is not a wholly satisfactory term
for non-adjudicatory, non-rulemaking action, in part because of the long tradition of referring to rules
made under the APA §§ 556-557 procedures as formal rules, and rules made under § 553 procedures
as informal rules. "Informal action," as I use the term here, does not include "informal rules."
9. The procedures specified in APA §§ 553-557 apply only to "rule making" and "adjudication."
Section 706's provisions concerning the scope of review specify a standard only for adjudications. APA
§ 706(2)(E).
10. APA § 706(2)(A).
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bitrary and capricious" is the standard that courts normally use to review
rulemaking under section 553; unless they wish to equate the standard by
which they review action under section 553 and the standard by which
they review the residuum, they must review such informal action for
abuses of discretion. Now, if the courts are looking for abuses of discre-
tion, it must follow that what they are looking at is exercises of discretion.
Thus, although it is not logically or even empirically true that all informal
agency actions are exercises of discretion, courts will typically label infor-
mal actions discretionary because the standard by which the actions are
reviewed uses that label."
1. The Prosecutorial Model
In 1969 Kenneth Culp Davis, a doyen of academic administrative law,
discovered "discretionary justice."12 More precisely, he discovered that the
police exercise discretion, a discovery already made by those who studied
the police rather than administrative law.13 He also discovered that prose-
cutors exercised discretion-another item not exactly news, at least to
scholars of criminal justice. Davis's book is nevertheless often cited by
courts, largely because Discretionary Justice is a convenient bibliographic
symbol of the feeling of academics and judges that, having tamed adminis-
trative adjudication and rulemaking, they must now tame discretion.
2. Fitting Administrative Discretion into the Framework of Administra-
tive Law
Difficulty in taming administrative discretion arises because there is a
tendency to lump together all behavior that falls into this residual cate-
gory, to analogize it to the discretion about which we know most,
prosecutorial discretion, and to impose a unified theory upon it. This ten-
dency to treat discretion as a single analytic concept is reinforced by the
practical needs of administrative lawyers. If the APA exempts actions
"committed to agency discretion" from judicial review,1 4 then we must
discover precisely which actions are so committed in order to resolve cru-
cial questions of judicial jurisdiction. Given the general inclination in the
1960's and 1970's to expand judicial control over agencies, much of the
11. It has become commonplace to point out that the APA provides both that "agency action...
committed to agency discretion by law" is excepted from judicial review, id. § 701, and that "[t]he
reviewing court shall. . . set aside agency action. . . found to be. . . an abuse of discretion," id. §
706. Courts have continuously narrowed the category of actions considered to be so discretionary as to
be exempted from review. See infra pp. 1491-92.
12. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
13. See J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 83-139 (1968).
14. APA § 701.
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original concern with discretion resembled a cowboy's attempt to cut as
many as possible out of the unmarked herd and brand them as non-
discretionary, or at least as reviewable even if discretionary.
The principal device for ensuring reviewability was the judicially cre-
ated doctrine that, despite the APA's language about actions "committed
to agency discretion," courts may review an agency's action unless "there
is no law to apply."1 Because virtually no administrative action occurs
entirely outside of some statutory authorization,1 there is nearly always
some law to apply. Thus, although informal action might not have to con-
form to the procedural standards of sections 553, 556, and 557, it is re-
viewable. As discussed above, the only distinct standard of review availa-
ble is abuse of discretion.
B. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe: Reviewing Admin-
istrative Discretion
Traditionally, claims of abuse of discretion involved four kinds of con-
tentions: (i) the agency had considered an irrelevant factor; (ii) it had
failed to consider a relevant factor; (iii) it had given improper weight to a
relevant factor; or (iv) it had decided without sufficient evidence.1 All of
these factors were involved in one of the first great signposts on the way to
increased judicial review of informal action, Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe'8 In Overton Park, the plaintiffs challenged the Secre-
tary of Transportation's decision to construct a superhighway that would
bisect a park. They argued that the Secretary should have employed the
procedures of section 553 or of sections 556 and 557. The Supreme Court
rejected that claim, but held that the Secretary's action was reviewable
and that the standard by which to review it was whether the action was
"arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion." 9 If the Secretary's in-
formal administrative action involved "a clear error of judgment," it
would be invalidated.
20
Standards for judicial review are notoriously vague. The degree to
which a court will substitute its judgment for an agency's is neither deter-
mined nor expressed by the formula it announces. A standard of judicial
review expresses only a "mood. '21 Changes in the language used to de-
15. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
16. At the very minimum, an agency's action must be dependent on the enabling statute that
brought the agency into existence.
17. See Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discre-
tion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367, 368 (1968).
18. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
19. Id. at 413-14.
20. Id. at 416.
21. Cf Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record", 64 HARV. L. REV.
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scribe the scope of review do, however, express changes in mood. To un-
derstand the change of mood represented by Overton Park, it is worth
placing "clear error" in the context of earlier language concerning review
of agency action.
1. Standards of Review for Agency Adjudication and Rulemaking
Originally, administrative adjudication was governed by the "substan-
tial evidence" requirement, rulemaking by the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard, and informal action by the "abuse of discretion" test. 2 These
standards for judicial review of agency decisions apparently stemmed from
earlier efforts to articulate standards for appellate review of trial court
proceedings and differed in the intensity of their scrutiny.23 None called
for "de novo" review, that is, for independent weighing of the evidence by
the reviewing body.2" Such appellate activism is extremely unusual in
American criminal and civil procedure, and almost unheard of in judicial
review of administrative proceedings.
25
The substantial evidence test involves the most searching judicial scru-
tiny. Initially, the test required only that the reviewing court determine
whether the agency had amassed substantial evidence on its side.2 6 If there
was substantial evidence supporting the agency's determination, it did not
matter how much evidence the other side had compiled.27 Eventually,
however, the test became "substantial evidence on the record as a
whole" 8 and the substantiality of the agency's evidence was established
only after the reviewing court had discounted the agency's evidence by
considering rebuttal evidence. 9 Thus, the court had, to make some inde-
1233, 1236 (1951) ("ultimate effect [of Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951)] is
not so much to give guidance to the judges of the reviewing courts as to . . .indicat[e] the spirit or
mood in which the judges should approach their task").
22. See APA § 706(2)(A) (requiring courts to overturn agency behavior found to be "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"); id. § 706(2)(E) (requir-
ing "substantial evidence" in cases subject to §§ 556-557 rulemaking); W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P.
STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 257-350 (7th ed. 1979).
23. See Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis,
58 HARV. L. REV. 70 (1944).
24. The APA calls for de novo review on an "unwarranted by the facts" standard in only a few
narrow circumstances. APA § 706(2)(F).
25. See Glick, Independent Judicial Review of Administrative Rate-Making: The Rise and De-
mise of the Ben Avon Doctrine, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 305 (1971).
26. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950), rev'd, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
27. See W. GELLH01N, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, supra note 22, at 257-76; Jaffe, supra note 21, at
1234; Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1026, 1049-50
(1941).
28. See O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 508 (1951); Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 485 & n.21, 487-88 (1951).
29. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490-91 (1951); Jim Causley Pontiac v.
NLRB, 620 F.2d 122, 123 (6th Cir. 1980). See generally Jaffe, supra note 21 (discussing Universal
Camera's alteration of substantial evidence requirement).
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pendent assessment of both sides' evidence. If, however, a residuum of
unrebutted agency evidence survived the discounting process and if that
residuum was substantial, then the agency's action was upheld even if its
decision ran against the weight of the evidence in the whole record. 0
Agency rulemaking was initially governed by a standard clearly less
strict than either of the standards applied to adjudication. The require-
ment that rules not be "arbitrary and capricious" bore a strong family
resemblance to the test employed by appellate review of jury verdicts. An
agency was not required to show that its rule was supported by substan-
tial evidence. Indeed, there was initially no evidentiary record in rulemak-
ing proceedings, and courts generally presumed that the agency had evi-
dence supporting its rule.3 1 As the requirement of a "rulemaking record"
developed, 2 however, the "arbitrary and capricious" test came to resemble
the substantial evidence test because both asked essentially the same ques-
tion: Could a reasonable policymaker facing the evidence spread before
the agency arrive at the agency's conclusion?
33
Finally, non-adjudicative, non-rulemaking informal agency action was
either exempt from review altogether or subject to review only for abuse
of discretion.34 The absence of a record requirement in informal non-
rulemaking decisions eliminated judicial review of the sufficiency of the
evidence. Instead, courts developed an essentially "good faith" review of
such agency decisionmaking. If the agency appeared to have acted in good
faith-without bias, prejudice, or fundamental unfairness-then courts
would uphold its discretionary decisions without demanding any particu-
lar quantum of evidence.
In practice, as we have noted, the "substantial evidence" and "arbitrary
and capricious" tests tended to merge after courts began to require records
in rulemaking. If "abuse of discretion" were identical to "arbitrary and
30. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 601-05 (2d ed. 1982).
31. See Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185 (1935) (if court can imagine
any set of facts that would justify agency's determination, it must uphold agency's action); cf. Kotch v.
Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 562-64 (1947) (rejecting equal protection challenge
because nepotism in selection process might conceivably be related to safety).
32. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("not conso-
nant with the purpose of a rule-making proceeding" to rely on inadequate or undisclosed informa-
tion), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
33. The courts often uttered the words "arbitrary and capricious" and "an abuse of discretion"
with so little pause that the two tests might have been one. Surely, if one acts arbitrarily and capri-
ciously, one also abuses one's discretion. In practice, however, there was a distinction between the two.
As the rulemaking record requirement emerged, an agency confronting the arbitrary and capricious
standard had to bring forward evidence in support of its rule. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 143 (1967); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 705 (2d
Cir. 1975) (Lumbard, J., concurring) ("In essence I think that when an agency engages in substantive
rule-making, it abuses its discretion (or acts arbitrarily or capriciously) if its actions are not supported
by substantial evidence."); Industrial Union Dep't AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 485 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Pedersen, supra note 5, at 48-49.
34. See Associated Indus. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973).
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capricious," then all three standards would now tend to merge. Neverthe-
less, both in theory and in "mood," a perceptible spectrum of severity ran
from substantial evidence (adjudication) through arbitrary and capricious
(rulemaking) to abuse of discretion (informal action). Because none of the
words in any of the standards of judicial review had any extrinsic mean-
ing, both Congress and the courts tended to express their feelings about
the proper level of judicial deference toward agency decisionmaking by
using language that moved toward one end of the spectrum or the other.
Direction of movement, more than the words themselves, conveyed the
mood.
2. The Clear Error Standard and Review of Discretionary Agency
Action
Overton Park announced an explicit standard for review of informal
action-"clear error of judgment." 5 These words have no more precise
meaning than those of the earlier standards. They do, however, convey a
movement toward the less deferential end of the review spectrum. 6 "Sub-
stantial evidence" occupies a place somewhere between "weight of the evi-
dence" and "arbitrary and capricious." "Clear error" resides in the same
neighborhood. Indeed, it seems about a block closer to "weight of the evi-
dence": An agency might have been guilty of clear error in striking the
final evidentiary balance but nonetheless have had substantial undis-
counted evidence on its side.
37
This analysis suggests that Overton Park moved informal agency action
from the least demanding point on the spectrum of jtidicial review-abuse
of discretion-to the most demanding point-a point between "substantial
35. 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
36. Cf Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951) (Taft-Hartley Act's change
of standard of review in NLRA cases shows "mood [that] must be respected, even though it can only
serve as a standard of judgment and not as a body of rigid rules").
37. In announcing this standard, the Court may not have remembered that judicial review of
administrative proceedings resembles review by appellate courts of trial court proceedings. Without
that resemblance, we might not know where to place "dear error of judgment" along our spectrum of
review standards. When the resemblance is taken into account, however, a rather startling result
emerges. If "against the weight of the evidence" is the standard of de novo review, and "arbitrary and
capricious" is the standard for review of jury trials, then "clear error" is the standard for review of
non-jury trials, see Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 113-15 (9th Cir. 1962). Appellate courts
must respect the findings of juries unless the findings are beyond the bounds of reason, but they owe
findings of a trial court judge sitting alone somewhat less respect. To avoid de novo review, appellate
judges will not reverse a trial court just as factfinder simply because they would have come to a
different conclusion on the weight of the evidence. But they will reverse when the trial judge has made
a clear error. "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); see FED. R.
Clv. P. 52(a). In short, the clearly erroneous standard expresses reviewing court deference to the trial
judge, but not quite so much deference as is due to a jury.
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evidence" and "against the weight of the evidence." This conclusion is
bolstered by whatever the phrase "clear error" means. Clear error must
be a species of error. In employing this standard, a judge must decide
whether the agency was in error or not in error, and then whether the
degree of error was great enough to be characterized as clear. This cer-
tainly looks like an independent weighting of the evidence with the agency
given only the benefit of the doubt.
All of this is not to say that Overton Park, by substituting "clear error"
for "abuse of discretion," compels courts to review informal non-
rulemaking action more actively than they review informal rulemaking
under the traditional "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Nevertheless,
the use of "clear error" language appears to be a movement toward the
less deferential end of the spectrum. As my use of the metaphors of spec-
trum, neighborhood, and family resemblance is meant to suggest, it would
be quite unrealistic to create a formal system of degrees of deference out of
these open-textured legal materials. They do, however, seem to yield the
result that informal non-rulemaking activity is to be reviewed under a
standard at least as strict as that for informal rulemaking, and perhaps an
even stricter one.
Although the Supreme Court itself has not appeared very fond of the
"clear error" language in Overton Park, the D.C. Circuit has been very
fond of it indeed."8 If we combine "clear error" with "so long as there is
law to apply," we have constructed the springboard from which the next
great leap forward of judicial review of administrative decisionmaking
may occur. The previously invented standards-"substantial evidence"
and "arbitrary and capricious"-have done triple duty as evidentiary
standards, procedural standards, and substantive review standards. There
is every reason to believe that "clear error" has the same potential to
spread the new judicial review of informal action into all three realms.
Thus, the historical tendency of administrative law's move from adjudi-
cation to rulemaking to informal action means we should now focus on the
informal actions of government that used to be called discretionary. All
students of administrative law know, however, that elements of what was,
and often still is, called discretion are also liberally scattered through ad-
ministrative adjudication and rulemaking; there are often a number of al-
ternatives, no single one of which is dictated by the law and the facts.
Such situations arise in the procedural aspects of adjudication (e.g., agency
decisions to limit cross-examination) as well as throughout the rulemaking
38. A LEXIS search showed 83 invocations of the test by the D.C. Circuit between May 10, 1972
and March 22, 1983.
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process. Our concern with control of agency discretion therefore encom-
passes a broader area than merely informal agency action.
II. Administrative Discretion in Its Wider Political Context
So far this discussion has proceeded as if administrative law, once trig-
gered by the New Deal, developed autonomously. Outside forces were also
important, however, and they are particularly important in explaining the
current situation. At the same time that administrative law is apparently
moving toward greater restraints on agency discretion, a number of com-
mentators have been calling for greatly expanded agency discretion. Bruce
Ackerman and William Hassler have suggested a return to the New
Deal's broad delegations to those agencies whose enormous discretion is
justified by their technical expertise; 9 Richard Stewart has proposed a
shift away from "command" processes, like adjudication and rulemaking,
toward bargaining and negotiation.40 Stewart acknowledges that such a
shift would increase agency discretion, and calls for judicial review.41 Both
proposals seem opposed to the prediction that administrative law is now
poised to catch up with and limit discretion as it earlier caught up with
and limited adjudication and rulemaking.
To some extent, however, these crosscurrents prove my point. The calls
for increased discretion recognize that discretion, particularly in rulemak-
ing, has been so restricted by legal rules, emanating from both Congress
and the courts, that it is time to take a new tack.
A. The Tension Between Democracy and Technocracy
The Ackerman-Hassler and Stewart proposals reflect a cycle of Ameri-
can politics that alternately assists and impedes the movement toward
greater legal restraints on agency action. From the founding of the repub-
lic, Americans have embraced two opposing modes of public administra-
tion, the democratic and the technocratic. The former, which we might
term the Jacksonian tradition, calls for government by the common people
themselves, or at least by administrators directly representative of and re-
sponsive to the people. Rotation in office through the spoils system illus-
trates this tradition. As parties win and lose presidencies and governor-
ships, their loyal partisans, themselves drawn broadly from the lay
population, move in and out of administrative office.
4 2
39. B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
40. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1341-53 (1981).
41. Id. at 1348.
42. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 21.
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The opposing, Federalist tradition, first advocated by Hamilton, stresses
the need for efficient government and thus the need for an administration
staffed not by an ever-changing stream of Know-Nothings, but by ex-
perts.4s The Progressive movement inherited this tradition, and its civil
service "reform" rooted out the spoils system. The corps of civil servants it
created was not only permanent, thus acquiring technical expertise on the
job, but was recruited through an examination system that tested technical
competence to do a particular job rather than general education or man-
agement capacity. 44 The Progressives even extended this meritocratic ideal
to replace certain elected chief executives with technocrats. The regulatory
commissions they established created whole governments in miniature,
possessing legislative, executive, and judicial functions, that could be run
by "non-political" experts.
B. The New Deal
The New Deal was the culmination of this technocratic tradition. It
flooded Washington with agencies overwhelmingly staffed by technically
trained specialists who soon achieved permanent civil service status.45 The
watchword of administration became expertise, and the key doctrine of
judicial review of administrative action became deference to that expertise.
Discretion and expertise became synonymous. 6
The democratic and technocratic traditions do not alternate with one
another in some mechanical way. Both traditions are always alive, but
there are periods in which one clearly dominates the other. Thus, al-
though the New Deal's predominant strain was technocratic, New Deal-
ers were also aware of democratic traditions. Particularly among New
Deal ideologists, there was a need to bridge the contradictions between
democracy and technocracy. They did so through concepts of representa-
tive bureaucracy and public interest. If we no longer had the direct de-
43. See id. at 19.
44. See Shapiro, Judicial Activism, in THE THIRD CENTURY: AMERICA AS A POST-INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY 109, 121 (S. Lipset ed. 1979).
45. Id. at 121-23.
46. See J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23-26, 31 (1938); Shapiro, supra note 44, at
123; Shapiro, supra note 1, at 19; Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1677-78 (1975). The technocratic character of the New Deal is sometimes
obscured, particularly in the context of regulation, because the New Deal's major regulatory initia-
tives were in such areas as labor relations and securities markets. In these areas, the regulators spoke
"law" rather than "science." Technocracy should not be confused with technology in the narrow sense
of applied physical and biological science. The New Deal did bring many technologists in that sense
into the Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Standards, and other agencies. It also conceived of
itself as bringing experts in social work, labor relations, public utility management, and corporate
securities into other agencies, persons just as technically expert in their respective fields as the soil
chemists and foresters were in scientific technologies. The hallmark of technocracy is not the language
of the hard scientists, but rule by specialists in particular areas of human endeavor.
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mocracy of the spoils system in which the people themselves rotated
through administrative offices, we had replaced it with a representative
administrative bureaucracy. in which the bureaucrats were, somehow or
other, as representative of the American people as were its elected repre-
sentatives. Alternatively, the bureaucracy itself was seen as democratic,
because public administration served "the public interest"-that is, the
interest of the people.
4
7
C. The Middle Decades
This ideological whitewash was soon replaced by a new theory and
practice of administrative democracy. As the New Deal receded in the
1950's and finally came apart in the welter of conflicts over race, Viet-
nam, and the environment, technocracy lost its dominant position. A
group theory of politics arose in its place, emphasizing group access to,
and domination of, the administrative decisionmaking process. 8 The the-
ory, which came out of ethical relativism and positivism (or, to say the
same thing, utilitarianism) denied that there was a public interest or a
true set of public values.49 The definition of "the good" became proce-
dural. Whatever policy emerged from a decisionmaking process in which
all relevant interests participated was good policy. Thus, the key to ad-
ministration was participation. Bureaucrats would become democrats by
reflecting the voice of the people as expressed to them by the interest
groups.
The New Deal had created the problem of discretion vested in experts.
New Deal lawyers solved this problem by making administrative adjudi-
cation more judicial and abandoning most of the rest of administration to
technocracy. 0 The swing during the 1950's toward democratic adminis-
tration in the form of group politics led to the next step in legalization.
Lawyers, the courts, and Congress busied themselves in creating proce-
dural rules to limit administrative discretion by forcing administrators to
give access to interest groups. 51 These procedural limitations on adminis-
trative decisionmaking imposed not only legal limits on agency discretion
but also democratic limits: The procedural requirements ensured that
agencies would submit themselves to the democratic process of group
struggle. The expansion of the law of standing, and the creation of new
notice and comment or hybrid rulemaking processes are, of course, the
principal examples. Since the 1950's, then, the particular balance struck
47. See Shapiro, supra note 44, at 121.
48. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 19.
49. See id. at 20.
50. See Shapiro, supra note 44, at 121-22.
51. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 20-21.
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between democracy and technocracy has helped administrative lawyers to
bring yet another area of administrative action-rulemaking-under a re-
gime of legal rules. This congruence between the technocratic-democratic
cycle in public administration, and administrative law's internal, rule-
imposing dynamic created the appearance of an inevitable teleology in ad-
ministrative law, a teleology demanding that first adjudication, then
rulemaking, and finally the rest of administrative decisionmaking be
brought under legal rules enforced by judges.
As the cycle continued, however, this teleology became muddied. The
1960's and 1970's were a low point in American faith in expertise; group
theory lost much of its legitimacy.52 Critics charged that experts served
not the public interest but self-interests deeply entangled with narrow pri-
vate interests. The end result of struggles among groups was no longer
inherently good because, to paraphrase Orwell, some groups were far
more equal than others. 3 If the American people rejected both technoc-
racy and group access, what choice of administrative style was left? One
answer was none. Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and a host of other
politicians ran for office on a platform of simple opposition to
government.
54
The other administrative style still available was government by judici-
ary. If group access was not an adequate democratic control over adminis-
tration, judicial review might be. The judge was not a technocrat but a
common person, who knew as little about highway construction, atomic
energy, poultry science, and sewage treatment as any other citizen.55
Through "partnership" and "hard looks," judges, as representatives of the
people, could restore some element of democratic administration untainted
by group self-interest or technocratic specialization.
The judiciary's first reaction was to use its new-found legitimacy to
impose more rules on technocrats. These rules, however, were designed
largely to implement an increasingly unpopular theory of democratic ad-
ministration-the group theory. The new judge-made rules were proce-
dural rules for group access. From this beginning, however, the invention
of new rules on an ad hoc, ex post basis also frequently served to disguise
the judges' new role as armed representatives of the demos. Courts were
most likely to discover a new procedural rule when an agency's action
appeared to be the poor product of an excessive narrowing of technocratic
perspective-that is, when it showed the dark side of expertise. Each new
52. See id. at 22-23; Shapiro, supra note 44, at 123-26.
53. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 13 (1965) (discussing industry
and pressure-group "capture" of agencies).
54. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 25.
55. See Shapiro, supra note 44, at 125-26 ("judge as post-industrial hero").
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procedural invention both struck down a bad technocratic decision and
improved group access, and thus seemed to further both the technocratic
and the democratic ideals.
D. The Current Situation
By 1980, however, technocratic themes and a certain disillusion with
democratic administration began to reemerge. The contempt for technoc-
racy of the 1960's and 1970's had been bolstered by the widely held belief
that we produced so much and were so efficient that we could willingly
accept considerable technical inefficiency as the price of bringing techno-
crats to heel.
By 1980, productivity was once again a major American concern, and
we were casting eyes at the Japanese as models of technological efficiency.
In such a setting, renewed allegiance to technocracy was not simply a
nostalgic "return" to the New Deal but also the next episode in a techno-
cratic tradition stretching back to the founding of the republic. If produc-
tive efficiency is again our watchword, then discretion must be vested in
those who know how to do things.
Both the book by Ackerman and Hassler and the article by Stewart
explicitly acknowledge that their purpose is to accommodate environmen-
tal goals to the need for economic efficiency.56 Indeed, Stewart argues that
environmental improvement can come only through technical anti-
pollution innovations piggybacked on improved productivity.5 7 These au-
thors work against a background of increasing calls for rationality in the
regulatory process. Regulatory impact statements and cost-benefit analyses
are much in the air.58 Even judges have made a subtle shift from demand-
ing that the agencies listen and respond to all outside comments to de-
manding that they learn all the facts and consider all the alternatives.5 9
That is precisely the shift from democracy, in its group-politics version, to
technocracy. The agency need not act democratically, only rationally, cor-
rectly, and efficiently. In short, it can return to expert decisionmaking,10
Ackerman and Hassler, reacting to the economic and technical irration-
ality of a Congress dominated by group politics, and Stewart, fearful of
potential inefficiencies caused by government commands to industry, call
for a return to technocratic discretion. Ackerman and Hassler apparently
56. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 39, at 59-78; Stewart, supra note 40, at 1261.
57. Stewart, supra note 40, at 1288-1310.
58. The concern is most clearly evidenced in President Reagan's requirement that proposed major
rules be submitted to OMB for such cost-benefit analyses. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127
(1982).
59. See National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451-54 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
60. See Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L. REV. 393, 428-34
(1981).
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vest discretion solely in agency technocrats, although one version of their
program would give some discretion to industry acting under market con-
straints.61 Stewart vests discretion not in the agency but in a bargaining or
negotiation process in which agency and industry technocrats join. The
goal is environmental and safety policies that are not only rationally cost-
effective in and of themselves, but fully compatible with maximum eco-
nomic growth.62
Against this background, we should consider the wide range of discre-
tionary situations, and speculate on how, and the degree to which, such
discretion can be brought under legal rules.63 In the remainder of this
paper, I set out a tentative typology of administrative discretion and ex-
plore the courts' potential responses to these various forms of agency
activity.
III. A Typology of Administrative Discretion
There are a variety of forms that discretionary agency action might
take. One species-which we might term "traditional" discretion-occurs
in a variety of normal agency activities. The other-the "new" discre-
tion-has appeared as part of the current trend towards technocracy.
A. Traditional Discretion
Agency activity has long been marbled through with discretionary be-
havior. The courts' response to these various discretionary activities is
likely to depend crucially on the particular situation involved.
1. Distributive Decisions
Some agency decisions involve the allocation of scarce resources when
no legal rights or entitlements have been vested in particular individuals.
61. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 39, at 124-27.
62. See Stewart, supra note 40, at 1377.
63. There is a rather standard repertoire of possible constraints on administrative discretion. In
roughly descending order of severity they run: (1) creating substantive standards, rules, and statements
of purpose that constrain the range of lawful agency choice; (2) creating procedural rules for con-
straining the process by which the agency makes choices; (3) requiring the agency to create its own
substantive rules; (4) requiring the agency to create its own procedural rules; (5) requiring the agency
to establish and follow precedents; (6) requiring the agency to give reasons. Professor Rabin, a con-
tributor to this Symposium, has thoroughly explored the last option in Rabin, Job Security and Due
Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
60 (1976), and Professor Yellin relies heavily on this approach in his contribution to this Symposium,
see Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government: Institutional Designs for Environ-
mental Decisionmaking, 92 YALE L.J. 1300 (1983). The first strategy is designed to eliminate discre-
tion and is explored in the traditional debate on the non-delegation doctrine. The second and fifth are
an integral part of the jurisprudence of administrative adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing. The third and fourth are forcefully espoused by Professor Davis. See K. DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TREATISE 157-213 (2d ed. 1979).
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An agency may take the position that many legally qualified applicants
exist and that it has neither the statutory mandate nor the administrative
means to distinguish among them.6 Accordingly, it creates no standards
or criteria for such a choice and limits its procedures to the bare minimum
necessary to ensure that the applicants are legally qualified. The assign-
ment of public housing units in the face of substantial excess demand is a
good example. In Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority,5 the
agency essentially threw out pending applications every six months, and
matched incoming applications with newly occurring vacancies by having
desk workers thumb through the files until they found an applicant who
matched the vacancy. If we assume good faith on the part of the desk
workers, this process seems eminently fair, since it consists of a random
selection among equally qualified claimants for a scarce benefit that only
a few can receive.
The Second Circuit, however, was unwilling to assume such good faith
in the face of potential bribery or favoritism. Moreover, the agency did
not claim that its policy was intentionally random. Indeed, it suggested
that the desk workers were trying to choose some applications as somehow
better than others.66 In light of this implicitly merit-based allocation, the
court required the agency either to institute a non-discretionary process
(such as first-come, first-served) or to create an actual standard for choos-
ing among the qualified.
67
That there is not enough to go around may justify random or first-
come, first-served distribution; it does not justify arbitrary distribution. I
have little doubt that courts will increasingly either demand articulated
standards, adherence to precedent, and the provision of reasons for deci-
sion or insist upon a truly random allocation. This trend toward limited
administrative discretion will, however, be slowed by the factors discussed
in the following two sections.
2. High-Volume, Low-Level Decisions
Some agencies must make a great many decisions, none of which has a
very significant effect. Due to the volume of cases, the costs of even mini-
mum procedural guarantees are high. For this reason a great deal of
"negative" discretion goes unchecked. 8 Allowing agencies substantial neg-
64. See Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771,
792-93 (1975). Ronald Dworkin refers to this type of decision as "distributive." See Dworkin, Hard
Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1067-68 (1975).
65. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
66. Id. at 263 (citing New York City Housing Authority resolution that Authority prefers "cer-
tain specified classes of candidates").
67. Id. at 265.
68. The issuance of parking tickets is a good example of high-volume, low-level discretion. Inter-
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ative discretion is most defensible when an agency is asked to allocate a
great many insignificant goods to which no particular individuals have a
legal entitlement. It is not so much that discretion is desirable as that the
costs of controlling it seem to outweigh the meager benefits yielded by
such controls.
Not only is the game not worth the candle, but the administrative costs
of recordkeeping or reason-giving may severely deplete available re-
sources. 9 Judicial reluctance to impose elaborate due process require-
ments on various welfare programs may stem from a "welfare pool" the-
ory of legislative behavior:70 If legislatures appropriate only a fixed pool
of monies for a given welfare program, then that sum must be divided
between benefit payments to the poor clients of the program and salaries
to the middle-class bureaucrats who staff the programs. Imposing more
rigorous due process requirements, and thus higher administrative costs,
transfers tax dollars from the poor to the middle class. Of course, legisla-
tures may treat the costs of more elaborate process as add-ons rather than
extracting payment for them from the pool. If so,-due process costs remain
worth considering in terms of overall cost-benefit balances for the agency
but cease to impose transfer payments from the poor to the middle class.
Goldberg v. Kelly71 and its progeny show that courts may reject un-
bounded discretion when they view the benefit an agency confers as an
entitlement. In such cases, the benefit conferred is by definition neither
scarce nor small. Instead, it must be given to all who are entitled regard-
less of procedural costs. 2 A legislature may create statutory entitlements
nal review of small random samples of day-to-day performance, the preservation of a bare-bones
factual record (e.g., the date, time, meter number, a license number, and officer's name on the parking
ticket), and review of factfinding (e.g., "Your honor, my car was in the shop that day so it couldn't
have been parked there.") are all possible responses. We are not prepared, however, to require park-
ing officers to keep track of every instance in which they choose not to give tickets. Furthermore, the
low-cost option of eliminating discretion and ordering officers to ticket every violation may prove
unsatisfactory as irate motorists employ political pressure, if not physical violence, against ticketing
automatons that will not listen to the homeowner who has parked in his own driveway while opening
his garage door.
69. See Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes
on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims,
60 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 778-79 (1974); Verkuil, The Search for a Legal Ethic: The Adversary
System, Liberalism and Beyond, 60 SOUNDINGS 54, 63-64 (1977).
70. See W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, supra note 22, at 448 n.6.
71. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
72. This is not to say that courts do not balance the administrative costs against the individual
interest in the entitlements to arrive at the precise level of due process required, see Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976), but only that once an entitlement is declared, the agency will
no longer be permitted total discretion. See Griffeth v. Dctrich, 603 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1978) (requir-
ing due process for state and local welfare applicants where entitlement found under state and local
rules); Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974)
(imposing requirement of notice, comment, and explanation where entitlement to federally funded
housing found). For commentary on due process and its costs, see Simon, Liberty and Property in the
Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 146 (1983); Van Alstyne, Cracks in
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to try to prevent itself from meeting the costs of due process by reducing
benefits. The legislature can then rely on the courts to force it to treat the
costs of due process as add-ons. But unless courts specify the exact mone-
tary level of the entitlements they declare, financially hard-pressed legisla-
tures may try to recapture some portion of the costs of due process from
the benefits flow.
3. Subtle and Complex Assessments of Human Characteristics
Some agency decisions involve such subtle and complex human factors
that the agency may argue that it needs unbounded discretion. In cases
like Holmes, 3 an agency might argue that in picking tenants for public
housing it should consider the likelihood of family disintegration if hous-
ing were not provided, the potential for improved family relationships,
and the effect of various determinations on the sense of community in the
projects. Such judgments should be left to the expert and subjective per-
ceptions of decisionmakers, who have seen thousands of files and followed
up on thousands of placements, rather than reduced to rules, precedents,
and reasons. Such claims are most believable when an agency has the staff
and information-gathering capacities actually needed to make such subtle,
particularized judgments. In some areas, such as child placement, agencies
can claim expertise and demonstrate that their decisionmakers are given
the time and information necessary to make highly particularized judg-
ments. Courts hearing such cases often reject most constraints on agency
discretion. 4
In the absence of such capacity, discretionary activity is likely to be
subjected to substantial control even when we acknowledge that discretion
ideally should be exercised. Courts are likely to make the agency produce
standardized profiles of the most worthy applicants so that deci-
sionmakers, in no position to make subtle, correct judgments, can make
unsubtle, standardized judgments which can be reviewed for arbitrari-
ness.7 5 When judgments are highly particularized and rest on the totality
of a large number of factors, however, standards may in fact be useless
because they can do no more than list a large number of factors to be
considered; nearly any decision can somehow be justified in terms of that
"The New Property': Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
445 (1977).
73. See supra p. 1501.
74. See Note, Child Custody: Substantial Justice Toward Children or Procedural Purity for Par-
ents?, 7 U. DAYTON L. REV. 217 (1981).
75. This would seem to be the response of the court in the Holmes case itself. See Holmes, 398
F.2d at 265. For similar recommendations with respect to state education at the.graduate level, see
Gellhorn & Hornby, Constitutional Limitations on Admissions Procedures and Standards, 60 VA. L.
REV. 975, 1002-08 (1974).
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list. Requiring reasons would either impose very high administrative costs,
as experts seek to write out a particular account of their complex thought
processes, or would degenerate into an inventory of routine formulas to be
attached to each decision. Requiring that precedent be followed suffers
from a similar difficulty: Decisions simply recorded, without reasons
given, cannot be used as precedents. In light of these difficulties, courts
are likely to eschew substantive review of decisions involving complicated
assessments of human characteristics, and instead impose procedural safe-
guards to ensure that sufficient attention is paid to each case by really
expert, particularized decisionmakers and to guarantee that internal re-
view proceedings, in which one expert checks on another, are available: 6
4. Agency Waivers
Where the uniform application of a rule generates a small number of
random, unforeseeable inequities-either absolute hardships or instances
of one person being treated more harshly than most others-we may want
to give agencies the discretion to grant waivers." The less random and
more anticipated the inequities, and the higher their numbers, the more
we should be alert for pseudo-waivers-that is, for the employment of
discretionary waivers when a new rule should be made. The problem of
pseudo-waivers becomes acute when the regulated parties are a few very
large firms: Modifying the application of a rule for one has a major im-
pact on the policy as a whole. It is also acute when an exceptions or
waiver process is employed not to relieve those who suffer from highly
individualized and unforeseeable harms but to relieve whole classes of
persons or enterprises on the basis of shared characteristics which were or
could have been foreseen."' In such instances, an exceptions or waiver
process easily becomes a form of back-door discretionary rulemaking freed
from the rigors of notice-and-comment procedures. In such cases, an
agency writes a single rule for all and then establishes patterns of excep-
tions or waivers that actually constitute subsidiary policy. Of course, legis-
latures often pave the way for this kind of agency behavior by passing
statutes that impose overly severe rules and by adding waiver provisions
through which they intend for agencies to apply their prescriptions in a
more discriminating fashion.
76. See J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 194-227 (1983).
77. See Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation
of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 283-89; see also Aman,
Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277
(discussing role of exceptions in administrative equity).
78. See Schuck, supra note 77 (describing "class exception" from 1979 gasoline allocation
regulations).
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Faced with such agency behavior, courts must ask whether what they
are asked to review resembles a highly particularized plea for equity or
policymaking by exception. 79 If they face policymaking by exception,
courts are likely to insist on something like the rules for hybrid rulemak-
ing that encourage third party intervention. To the degree that waiver
proceedings are seen as essentially equitable, the only relevant parties are
the individual complaining of the injustice and the government agency
whose actions he alleges to be unjust. When, however, waivers involve
whole classes of persons seeking a special rule or class exemption, then
there are many other relevant parties-various "public" interests and
those who will have to continue under the general rule because they are
not of the class seeking the special rule or exemption. Such multi-party,
policy-oriented proceedings must inevitably suggest to courts the standard
procedural solutions, namely notice-and-comment proceedings under sec-
tion 553, as elaborated by the cases of the 1960's and 1970's.
5. Thematic Statutes
I noted earlier that although the historical dynamic is moving adminis-
trative law beyond adjudication and rulemaking, huge areas of discretion
remain uncharted. One of the most intransigent consists of circumstances
in which agencies are faced with "thematic" statutory commands to take
into account a number of goals or factors but are given no assignment of
relative weights to those factors. One can imagine statutes of this sort ar-
ranged along a spectrum. At one end lie those statutes which, in announc-
ing a number of purposes, state priorities or weights as clearly and exactly
as they can.80 At the other end lie "lottery" statutes in which contending
forces in the legislature, unable to agree on weights, placed all their con-
tending preferences in the statute as the only available alternative to hav-
ing no statute at all.81 In the latter cases, the legislators submit the
79. See Comment, The Exceptions Process: The Administrative Counterpart to a Court of Equity
and the Dangers It Presents to the Rulemaking Process, 30 EMORY L.J. 1135 (1981).
80. One example would be statutes that give a specific number of bonus points to veterans on civil
service examinations. These statutes specify exactly how much weight is to be given to the purpose of
rewarding veterans as against the weight to be given to the purpose of maintaining an efficient service.
See Fleming & Shanor, Veterans' Preferences in Public Employment: Unconstitutional Gender Dis-
crimination?, 26 EMORY L.J. 13, 17 nn.12 & 14 (1977) (citing various state and federal preference
formulas).
81. The 1940 amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, for example, emerged from
struggles among railroads, truck lines and barge lines. The purpose of the Act was couched in the
following terms: "It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress to
provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation . . . so administered as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each. . . ." Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, §
1, 54 Stat. 898, 899 (1940). The Act also mandated "reasonable charges for transportation services
. . . [and] fair wages." Id. It was therefore essentially nothing more than a vague instruction to the
ICC about how to use its broad discretion to set rates.
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weighting to the administrative agency for a decision essentially random
in the eyes of the legislators; they cannot anticipate which meaning the
agency will adopt. The middle of the spectrum involves statutes in which
legislators have provided some information about weights and therefore
can partially anticipate the choices of the administrative agency. The non-
delegation doctrine expresses the belief that lottery statutes abdicate the
legislature's responsibility to make basic policy decisions and leave admin-
istrative discretion absolutely uncabined.8 2 The agency can easily meet
any procedural requirements, give reasons, enunciate standards-in short,
do whatever the courts want-while basing its actions exclusively on one
of the statutory themes. The only meaningful judicial constraint on this
type of discretion is a command by the court that the agency give appro-
priate weight to each statutory theme.8 3 If the statute states no weights,
however, the agency may anticipate or respond to such a demand by sim-
ply declaring that it has taken account of all of them. The court may then
respond, as the Supreme Court did in Overton Park, by saying, "Prove
it." An alert agency can usually do so without in any way altering its
choice among the themes.
In such situations, courts have two choices, both involving substantive
judicial review. They may strike their own balance, declaring it the legis-
lature's true intent. In the Benzene case,"4 for example, the Supreme
Court read a requirement of "significant risk" into the statute; the agency
had to show such a risk before it could choose among a wide array of
mixes of health and efficiency."5 Alternatively, courts can read the lottery
out of the statute, claiming that the statute has a threshold single purpose.
In Overton Park, for example, the Court denied that the statute set park
preservation, neighborhood preservation, cost saving, and highway con-
struction as goals with unspecified weightings and instead found that park
preservation trumped the other statutory purposes."6 In short, precisely
because lottery statutes give agencies unlimited discretion, courts are likely
to deny that they are lottery statutes.
A great many cases concern the extent to which a statute encompasses
82. Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
63-67 (1983); see also T. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED
STATES 94-107 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing evolution of delegation to the administrative process).
83. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (EPA "must exercise its
discretion to choose an achievable emission level which represents the best balance of economic, envi-
ronmental, and energy considerations"); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (court "must ensure both that the Commission has adequately considered all relevant factors
. . . and that it has demonstrated a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made"'), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
84. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
85. Id. at 639.
86. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412-13 (1971).
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multiple unweighted goals or contains a paramount goal with offsetting
goals whose precise degree of offset the legislature knows but cannot ex-
press in statutory language. As we approach the pure lottery, judicial
checks on agency discretion are less and less defensible because there is no
particular reason to prefer pure judicial discretion to pure agency discre-
tion. The upswing in substantive review by the D.C. Circuit8 7 is in part a
response to Vermont Yankee's"8 limitations on further procedural regula-
tion of informal agency action, but it also represents a substitution of judi-
cial for administrative discretion where multi-purpose statutes require
someone to exercise discretion. The only perfect solution to the problem of
agency discretion in pure lotteries is for the legislature not to write lottery
statutes in the first place.
The courts are going to find it particularly difficult to engage in sub-
stantive review in high-technology areas. Comparing detailed but some-
what vague statutory provisions with highly complex administrative regu-
lations to determine whether the regulations are in accord with the statute
promises to be a fruitless task.89 The courts' own demands that agencies
act synoptically, gathering all facts and considering all alternatives and
outcomes, will result in increasingly complex and technical rulemaking
records. As national respect for the technocracy increases, and judges are
more often faced with materials prepared by technocrats, that technocrats
do understand and judges clearly cannot understand, courts will necessa-
rily scale back their review: Courts cannot take a hard look at materials
they cannot understand nor be partners to technocrats in a realm in which
only technocrats speak the language. I think we should anticipate that in
the future courts will be less, not more, successful at bringing thematic
discretion under judicial control than they have been in the past.
6. Decisions Under Conditions of High Uncertainty
Sometimes both government action and inaction entail unknowable
risks and unknowable benefits. Without any real indication of the effects
of various alternatives, these situations appear to be ones of pure discre-
tion: The decisionmaker faces a high and equal level of uncertainty about
the outcome of each alternative and cannot avoid uncertainty by doing
nothing. The agency can be controlled by various procedural and reason-
87. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (making
independent interpretations of statute and finding that agency flunked substantial evidence test for 38
of its rules); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (flatly overruling agency's
interpretation of statute).
88. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
89. The difficulty of the attempt is illustrated by Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323
(D.C. Cir. 1979). There, three judges each wrote a separate part of the court's opinion, which occu-
pied 68 pages in the Federal Reporter.
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giving requirements, but these controls do not ultimately limit its discre-
tion. Indeed, there seems to be neither a way of judicially limiting the
agency's discretion nor reason to do so.
The Benzene case90 provides a good example. At the time that OSHA
made its decision on maximum workplace exposure levels, existing re-
search could not tell which of a number of low exposure levels would
harm workers. Research showed that benzene was a carcinogen at high
dosages, but no one was able to draw "dose-response" curves for the low
dosages that industrial workers commonly received. 1 If OSHA did noth-
ing until it knew which low level exposures were safe and which were
unsafe, many deaths from cancer might occur. Similar damage would oc-
cur if OSHA set permissible levels too high. If OSHA set exposure levels
too low, however, industry would have to spend millions on reducing ex-
posures, and at least some marginal operators in some industries would be
forced out. In effect, the agency had a purely discretionary choice between
the one part per million level which was the lowest its instruments could
measure and the ten parts per million level above which inferences from
laboratory experiments were strong enough to establish a cancer risk.
Because administrative discretion cannot be subjected to judicial re-
straints in situations of high uncertainty, courts are likely to read congres-
sional limitations into the statute. In the Benzene case, for example, the
Court read into the statute a requirement that the agency establish "sig-
nificant risk" for low-level benzene exposure before it set a maximum
exposure level.9 In effect, this is a directive to the agency to resolve the
high uncertainty about low-level exposures in favor of cost-saving and
against worker safety until uncertainties can be substantially reduced.
Thus Congress, through the mouth of the Court, strips the agency of its
discretion.
The "significant risk" holding is a specific example of a more general
mode of limiting agency discretion. Where uncertainties are very high,
whoever bears the burden of proof loses. Congress and the courts may
limit discretion by creating burdens of proof and assigning them to
whatever purpose, interest, or value they least favor.9 3 Such assignments
of the burden of proof eliminate uncertainty in the short run; in the long
term, they are self-liquidating because as uncertainties disappear the bur-
den of proof can be met. Nevertheless, we may prefer the best guess of an
expert free to choose among a wide range of alternatives to an abstract
90. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
91. Id. at 620, 631-32.
92. Id. at 639-40.
93. See Maclntyre, A Court Quietly Rewrote the Federal Pesticide Statute, LAW & POL'Y Q.
(forthcoming).
1508
Vol. 92: 1487, 1983
Administrative Discretion
and more or less dichotomous choice made by Congress or the courts. In
any event, as the influence of technocratic administration increases, it will
become more difficult for judges to fault an agency's choice among alter-
natives that all involve complex and nearly equal technical uncertainties.
In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Yellin suggests beefing
up the requirement that reasons be given when an agency confronts high
uncertainties.9 In American Petroleum Institute v. Costle,9" the D.C.
Circuit noted that the EPA faced grave uncertainties in setting ambient
standards for ozone and held that an acknowledgment of the uncertainties
and an explanation of why they were resolved as they were would be
sufficient to meet the substantial evidence requirement of the statute in-
volved.96 Perhaps acknowledgment and explanation is about the only limi-
tation courts can honestly place on discretion created by uncertainty, since
any more substantively based standard of review merely shifts the locus of
discretion to the courts.
This type of administrative discretion, like the others described here,
involves a variant of the familiar line-drawing problem. Whether the per-
missible deviation from one person, one vote in order to maintain tradi-
tional boundaries should be eight or nine percent, or the minimum per-
missible level of peanuts in peanut butter should be 90 percent or 87
percent, or the permissible variation from a twelve person jury should stop
at six or five,97 is arbitrary, either because the cost-benefit gradient is so
smooth that no particular stopping point appears better than the next or
because the uncertainty about the effects of small changes is very high.
Courts tend to deny discretion either by resorting to pseudo-science to
prove that there are jumps in the cost-benefit gradient or by assigning
burdens of proof.
7. The Discretion to Initiate Action
Administrative discretion to initiate or not to initiate action might be
broken into two categories: the initiation of adjudications and the initia-
tion of rulemaking proceedings or other policymaking actions. The former
is closely analogous to prosecutorial discretion. Administrative agencies
typically enjoy enforcement resources far too limited to bring adjudicatory
actions against all worthy candidates. As Richard Stewart and Cass Sun-
stein have pointed out, this situation is about as pure an instance of "no
94. Yellin, supra note 63, at 1321-24, 1326.
95. 665 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
96. Id. at 1186-87.
97. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234-35 (1978). In Ballew, the Court found six-person
juries substantially better than five-person juries by relying on one study based on untestable
assumptions.
1509
The Yale Law Journal
law to apply" as one can find because, except in those rare instances
where Congress has absolutely mandated enforcement, there is no law
telling the agency which malefactors it should single out for investment of
its scarce prosecutorial resources." Initiation of rulemaking might, in con-
trast, be analogized to congressional discretion to make or not to make
laws since rulemaking is an exercise of Congress' delegated lawmaking
power. Here, too, there is no law to apply in the sense that, aside from
constitutional limitations, there is no control over which bills Congress
should or should not consider.
The analogy is, however, incomplete. It is true that in many instances
the delegation is so broad that the agency is placed very much in the posi-
tion of a legislative body with a limited capacity to make laws and an
almost infinite range of lawmaking options. In other instances, however,
Congress states relatively clear and limited goals, and rulemaking par-
takes more of enforcement than of lawmaking. Particularly over time, as
the agency builds up its body of rules, the next item on the agency's
agenda may become clearer and clearer and the agency's rulemaking re-
sources may appear more and more adequate to meet its remaining
agenda. Given the stated goals of various environmental statutes, for ex-
ample, there came a time when the Environmental Protection Agency
would have appeared quite derelict in its duties if it had not initiated rules
on atmospheric lead pollution.
Precisely because rulemaking is often a form of wholesale enforcement,
the existence of rulemaking authority may actually reduce an enforcement
agency's discretion because it brings the agency's resources more into line
with its obligations. 9 Once the Federal Trade Commission moved to rules
specifying industry-wide unfair practices, one could at least begin to argue
that particular industries should head the list for regulation. That argu-
ment will become more and more persuasive over time as the body of
rules increases so that the quantum of remaining practices to be regulated
appears smaller and smaller in relation to the Commission's capacity for
regulation.
Thus, discretion in the initiation of rules and probably of such informal
actions as planning decisions, can be constrained by relatively precise con-
gressional statements of goals and by the cumulative effects of the agency's
98. See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1195, 1285-
86 (1982).
99. For example, when the FTC's enforcement efforts consisted primarily of unfair trade practice
cases brought against individual firms, it occupied a position akin to that of a criminal prosecutor
The number of possible unfair trade practices was immensely greater than the number of adjudicative
proceedings the agency could initiate. When it began to employ rulemaking instead, see National
Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974),
the Commission's reach was vastly extended.
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own previous rulemaking activity. Aside from authorizing and encourag-
ing enforcement by rulemaking, it is much more difficult to constrain en-
forcement discretion wielded in the initiation of adjudications. The legisla-
ture may pick out a few items of mandatory prosecution and provide the
money that makes it possible to meet the mandate. Lawmakers may also
place certain negative checks on enforcement discretion, such as forbidding
agencies to enforce in a racially discriminatory way. Short of providing far
higher budgets to the agencies than it is likely to appropriate, however,
Congress by necessity will continue to leave many "no law" situations.
Stewart and Sunstein have suggested that administrative discretion not
to initiate various actions has now been checked by a body of judge-made
and statutory private rights of initiation. Where agencies do not initiate
action when they should, private persons may challenge those negative
exercises of discretion in the courts.100 The authors' data and arguments
are complex, and their enthusiasm for this mode of limiting discretion is
carefully bounded and qualified; no brief summary can do justice to their
position. Nonetheless, the bottom line seems to be that in most instances
the limit imposed on discretion would be the rather weak one of a reason-
giving requirement. In the trial of private right-of-initiation suits, courts
would require that the agency give reasons for not initiating action. Only
where a statute clearly mandates action or specifically condemns certain
inactions, such as inactions resulting in racial discrimination, would a
court order the agency to initiate action. 0
Particularly in those situations where the agency comes closest to meet-
ing the conditions of the analogy of prosecutorial discretion on the one
hand or of Congressional lawmaking discretion on the other, private rights
of initiation have probably not yet developed far enough to constitute a
definitive check on discretion. Only under bizarrely favorable procedural
circumstances are courts likely to order an agency to promulgate regula-
tions. 10 2 Stewart and Sunstein themselves are anxious to hedge private
rights to control agency prosecutorial discretion, lest private priorities be
allowed to disrupt public ones.
10 3
100. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 98, at 1267-89; see also J. MASHAW, INTRODUCTION TO THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 962-1021 (1975) (discussing implied private
rights of action and "citizen" enforcement of regulatory statutes).
101. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 98, at 1279.
102. See State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(requiring promulgation of airbag regulations by National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in
face of second order to rescind by Secretary of Transportation), vacated 103 S.Ct. 2856 (1983).
103. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 98, at 1267-89.
1511
The Yale Law Journal
B. The New Discretion
A number of commentators on administrative law have recently sug-
gested the creation of new modes of agency action. These new modes will
create new reservoirs of agency discretion. In this section, I discuss how
such discretion would operate and how courts may respond to it.
1. Negotiation, Mediation, and Arbitration
Richard Stewart proposes that agencies shift away from adjudication
and rulemaking and toward more cooperative forms of regulation. 10 4 In
Stewart's scheme, discretion can be a tool for overcoming resistance from
entrenched interests in both policymaking and implementation. 10 5 Some-
times, regulated groups may resist implementation so strongly that they
drive implementation costs up above levels acceptable to the regulator. In
such cases, agencies can be granted discretion to seek less than full compli-
ance with a law in order to reduce the costs of implementation. Such dis-
cretion must be relatively unbounded because it is precisely the resister's
inability to predict the agency's response that will move it to reach a nego-
tiated settlement.
10 6
Judicial review poses serious difficulties for the exercise of this form of
discretion. First, the availability of review itself changes the terms of the
game in ways that may be adverse to the government negotiator.107 Sec-
ond, judges may strike down an agency's choice of less than full enforce-
ment in return for cooperation. 08 Where an agency tempers its demands
in order to avoid amendments to its organic act, the bargain may appear
particularly unsavory.109
If courts see a range of individual degrees of compliance conformations
104. See Stewart, supra note 40, at 1341-53; see also Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure
for the Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982) (proposing negotiating as supplemental rulemaking
procedure).
105. Stewart, supra note 40, at 1372-73.
106. See T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 131-39 (1960).
107. Private parties have two major advantages: (1) If they do not like the outcome of the first
game, they may play again by challenging the legitimacy of the negotiated outcome in a subsequent
court action; (2) they can threaten such a replay during the first game and demand extra concessions
from the government as the price of not suing.
108. Where a statutory standard such as the requirement of a safe workplace exists, courts may
see the agency as violating its duty to achieve the standard by settling for partial fulfillment in a
particular instance. Cf. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510-12 (1981) (pro-
mulgation of OSHA regulations should be guided by feasibility of ensuring employee health rather
than by cost-benefit analysis). In addition, negotiation might conflict with rules against ex parte con-
tacts and restrictions in the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1982). See
Harter, supra note 104, at 33-34; Stewart, supra note 40, at 1344-50.
109. In effect, the agency is yielding to threats that if it fully enforces the statute, the regulated
interests involved will go to Congress and get the statute amended in their favor. While everyone
would agree that it is legitimate for the regulated interests to appeal to Congress, not everyone would
agree that it was legitimate for the agency to reduce enforcement to head off such appeals.
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that fall within the demands of the statute, they may uphold negotiation of
each individual conformation. The very fact of a negotiated settlement,
however, is likely to persuade judges (and the public) that there was a
"correct" legal rule or level of implementation and that the agency's nego-
tiations gave it away. 10
These considerations are further complicated when the agency is not
itself directly involved in negotiations but instead is ratifying a mediated
settlement among interested parties.111 Discretion not to approve a medi-
ated settlement is likely to be subject at most to the requirement that rea-
sons be given. Exercising discretion to ratify a private agreement might be
subject to a higher level of judicial review because it involves public en-
forcement of a private agreement. 1 2
As rulemaking has become more a form of multi-party adjudication,
more time-consuming, and more subject to judicial scrutiny, there has
been increasing interest in negotiating processes that would arrive at an
agreed-upon policy. Commentators like Stewart who espouse negotiation
have argued for less searching review of negotiated outcomes.1 13 But how
can we be sure that the agency has not given the store away in the course
of negotiations? In many instances, of course, enough opposing interest
groups will have participated to ensure that the agency has not given
away any version of the store. In other instances, however, the structure of
the bargaining conflict may leave the "public interest" unrepresented by
anyone but the agency.11 4 If we do not employ judicial review to check
administrative discretion in negotiation, how can it be checked? Of course,
Congress could theoretically formulate a new standard for reviewing in-
110. If the higher level of enforcement were not "correct," the argument is likely to run, why
would the regulated party refrain from challenging it in court rather than offering something (i.e.,
negotiating) to get it lowered?
111. Some schemes for environmental mediation, for instance, provide that developers and envi-
ronmental interests work out their own settlement, which is then' submitted to the relevant government
agency for approval. See Harter, supra note 104, at 40-42; Lee, Defining Success in Environmental
Dispute Resolution, RESOLVE, Spring 1982, at 1.
112. Although the application of the non-delegation doctrine in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), technically involved a delegation from Congress to the President, it was
clearly the delegation of public power to private groups at the heart of the NIRA that most troubled
the Court. Id. at 537 (delegation of legislative authority to trade associations or industrial associations
"is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of
Congress").
113. See Stewart, supra note 40, at 1348.
114. Where one side is well-organized and the other is a diffuse, ill-organized interest, such as
used-car buyers or carpentry hobbyists, there will be little or no interest-group check on the govern-
ment's negotiations with the well organized side. Cf. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,
439 U.S. 96 (1978) (upholding California statute that allowed existing car dealers effectively to block
market entry by using objections process); Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a
Public, Public Law, 54 TULANE L. REV. 849 (1980) (discussing interest-group influence on adminis-
trative law). Stewart recommends public funding of public interest groups to address this problem.
Stewart, supra note 40, at 1350-51.
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formal, negotiated agency action. I doubt, however, that judges would pay
much attention to such an expression of congressional mood standing by
itself.
One idea worth exploring is the employment of "reserve prices." Ex-
perts on bargain theory argue that one should always enter a bargaining
session having in mind an outcome below which one will not be prepared
to complete a bargain.' 15 In some cases, a precise dollar reserve price can
be set. In others, a reserve price can only be stated so vaguely that it is
meaningless as a guide to action. It is possible, however, to envision some
areas of government action-for instance, the setting of water purity stan-
dards-in which the statute could set a reserve price or minimum stan-
dard below which the agency could not accept a negotiated outcome, but
authorize the agency to set a much higher standard in a notice-and-
comment proceeding. Under such a scheme, courts might be persuaded to
curtail their review of negotiations because the agency's negotiating discre-
tion would already have been constrained by statute.
It is difficult to say whether or not the bargaining process would be
sharply skewed against the agency because its reserve price was known by
the other players while theirs would be unrevealed. 11" Still, there are
strategies an agency could use to improve its position. It might announce
before bargaining that it had itself set a goal of exceeding the statutory
reserve price in at least half of its negotiations, and that it would reject a
bargain and go to rulemaking in any particular proceeding if it felt that
settling for its reserve price in that proceeding would place its goal in
danger. In other words, the agency could set a secret reserve price above
the statutory reserve price but not below it. Thus, Congress could con-
strain agency discretion and the agency could maintain much of its bar-
gaining power. Particularly where Congress is interested in "technology
forcing," the combination of a reserve price and a "bargaining-upward"
arrangement may be preferable to setting unrealistic statutory standards
from which Congress itself must subsequently bargain a retreat.11
If we move from bargaining before rulemaking to enforcement bargain-
ing, we come closer to prosecutorial discretion in conventional law en-
forcement. Agencies such as OSHA or EPA have limited enforcement re-
sources and may prefer to offer something in the way of reduced
115. See H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATING 45 (1982) (describing reserve
prices as a natural feature of negotiation).
116. As a purely theoretical matter, all other things being equal, it no doubt would be. But when
the government is a player, all other things are rarely equal.
117. See State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Department of Trans., 680 F.2d 206, 210-11 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (discussing Congress' overruling of NHTSA's ignition interlock requirement), vacated, 103
S.Ct. 2856 (1983).
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enforcement as an inducement to voluntary compliance."' Of course,
agencies may sometimes prefer to bargain for another reason altogether.
They may fear that full enforcement will mobilize sufficient political op-
position to lead to congressional amendment of the statutes authorizing
their programs. 119 Most of us, and surely most courts, would find an ex-
plicit use of such "prudential" discretion illegitimate. In practice, such
discretion may not be dearly identifiable. Regulated entities can engage in
a wide range of resistance to agency activity. They can seek full adminis-
trative and judicial review; they can lobby Congress to curtail the agency's
power. 20 If an agency is entitled to take into account the degree to which
its scarce resources will be consumed in responding to other modes of re-
sistance, why shouldn't it take account of the drain on its resources that a
defensive lobbying campaign in Congress will cause?
There has, however, been a tendency, both in statutory and case law, to
treat regulatory benefits as entitlements.1 21 Under OSHA, for example,
courts might discover an entitlement to a safe workplace. 12 This approach
tends to treat enforcement discretion as illegitimate and to demand full
enforcement of the entitlement. Thus, there is a growing interest in pri-
vate actions to challenge agency failure to initiate full enforcement pro-
ceedings or to challenge agency settlements, despite the traditional view
that the agency's behavior resembles prosecutorial discretion.1 23
This tendency is fueled by the ease with which "political" considera-
tions may be confounded with considerations of scarcity. A particular ad-
ministration may underenforce a particular program not because its re-
sources are scarce but because it does not believe in the program, or at
least not in the version of the program created by the rulemaking of the
previous administration.1 24 If a new administration proceeds to offer re-
duced enforcement for voluntary compliance, it will claim scarcity. Its op-
ponents will charge that it is modifying the program, not through above-
board resort to new rulemaking proceedings or requests to Congress to
118. Such a suggestion is made in E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROB-
LEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 135-40 (1982).
119. The well-known saga of the FTC shows the perils of not giving in to such fears. See Wein-
gast & Moran, The Myth of Runaway Bureaucracy-The Case of the F.T.C., REGULATION, May/
June 1982, at 33.
120. Id.
121. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 98, at 1208-20, 1271-75.
122. Stewart argues against such a discovery in Paradoxes of Liberty, Integrity and Fraternity:
The Collective Nature of Environmental Quality and Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 7
ENVTL. L. 463 (1977).
123. See Mashaw, "RJghts"in the Federal Administrative State 92 YALE L.J. 1129, 1170 (1983);
Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 98, at 1197.
124. See State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Department of Trans., 680 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
vacated, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (1983).
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amend the statute, but through devious underenforcement disguised as en-
forcement bargaining.
Faced with these problems, courts have a number of alternatives. They
may create additional enforcement entitlements. They may decide whether
the agency's true goal is deliberate underenforcement designed to under-
mine statutory mandates or bargaining to get more bang for the enforce-
ment buck. Or they may adhere to the traditional analogy of prosecutorial
discretion. The first alternative runs the risk that whoever gets to the
courthouse door first will obtain full enforcement of his particular entitle-
ments no matter what the cost and thus reduce excessively the enforce-
ment resources available for the protection of others' entitlements.1" 5 The
second option raises the root problem of discretion-probing the true in-
tentions of the administrator.12 A requirement that reasons be given is
likely to lead to routine formulas about insufficient enforcement budgets.
The third alternative leaves us no way to determine whether the agency is
trading reduced enforcement for voluntary compliance in order to stretch
its enforcement dollars or is not fully enforcing the statute for some less
acceptable reason.
Some agencies absolutely eschew enforcement discretion; OSHA, for in-
stance, tells its inspectors to write up every violation. 2 7 Where some en-
forcement bargaining appears desirable, it is probably easiest to limit dis-
cretion by specifying in organic statutes the agenda and terms of
bargaining; otherwise, any lapse in agency enforcement can be excused as
an implicit bargain. The simplest form of bargaining may be a joint
agency-enterprise agreement to a time-staged compliance plan explicitly
displaying the tradeoffs between voluntary compliance and enforcement
delay. In addition, the statute or the courts may require an agency to
establish rules setting the general terms of tradeoffs between voluntary
compliance and enforcement delay. The "blue book" with which assistant
prosecutors work in some large district attorney's offices exemplifies such
constrained discretion.128 In effect, it sets reserve prices below which a
prosecutor cannot go. If offered less, he or she must seek full-or, in the
agency context, immediate-enforcement.
Such deliberately structured bargaining in which the quid pro quo and
125. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 98, at 1292-93.
126. See Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1196-97
(1973); Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administration: Hearing Variations and Standards of
Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 721, 722-33 (1975).
127. See E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 118, at 56.
128. See Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Discretion, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1562-
65 (1981). Specific practices come and go as elected district attorneys come and go, but usually in-
volved is a set of instructions from the head of the agency as to how far a charge may be reduced
under particular circumstances without special permission from a supervisor.
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the reserve price are matters of public record could provide adequate re-
straints on discretion without judicial review. Where bargaining is not so
carefully structured, however, it is difficult to see what courts can do ex-
cept either start down the Overton Park path of motive review or abandon
review altogether by invoking the analogy to prosecutorial discretion.
Overton Park, however, very much reflects the glorification of the judge
as lay representative, and the disdain for both group politics and technoc-
racy, of the 1960's and 1970's. Moreover, in Overton Park the Depart-
ment of Transportation did not even attempt a technical screen for its
simple, essentially political decision to accept the solution propounded by
a local government. In a more technocratic era in which agencies have
learned to justify each bargain in terms of the long-term pursuit of maxi-
mum technical and economic rationality, courts may be reluctant to spot
clear errors. Courts may be quite content if an agency can give reasons for
the bargains it has struck.
2. Agency Delegation
In a recent book, Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler advocate a
variant of the New Deal's image of discretion vested in expert agencies
that pursue broadly stated goals set by Congress.129 They suggest that
Congress set only time-staged performance goals, such as increasing life
expectancy by one percent at the end of ten years. 3 The goal having
been set, and the lawmaking power having been delegated, the agency
would then have almost unlimited discretion in deciding how to meet that
target. Such technocratic proposals reflect society's swing back toward a
greater respect for expertise. This shift toward technocracy, however, is
bound to be greatly tempered both by the long-term trend toward bringing
the executive branch's actions under legal control and by the increasing
disenchantment with regulation by command. Thus, it may be to Stephen
Breyer's proposals for regulatory reform that we must turn to give content
to Ackerman's vision.
Breyer proposes that in many areas of regulation the agency should set
performance standards or output goals, and leave the instrumental deci-
sions to those regulated. 31 Combining the proposal of Ackerman and
Hassler with that of Breyer may produce a system of "sub-specification."
For example, Congress may command an agency to save 10,000 lives by
1995. The agency may decide that the best way to save those lives by 1995
is to reduce lead pollution levels to X. It might then assign to each source,
129. B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 39.
130. See id. at 126.
131. See Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives and
Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549 (1979).
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each corporation, or each industry an annual pollution-reduction target. If
the agency were to assign targets to collective entities, then each entity
would presumably subspecify targets to each individual source. These in-
dividual sources would then choose their own technology and/or transfer
of pollution rights.
Viewed independently from Breyer, Ackerman and Hassler appear to
be vesting great discretion in the agencies. Combining the proposal of
Ackerman with that of Breyer, one might view the result as virtually
eliminating both policymaking and implementation discretion from the
agency; the combined proposal vests policy discretion almost entirely in
the legislature and implementation discretion almost entirely in the mar-
ket. Ultimately, individual firms would make market-dictated choices
among the alternative means available to meet their assigned goals. Imple-
mentation discretion rests at whatever level makes actual instrumental
choices. This assignment of discretion may raise Schechter-type
problems,132 since it is unclear why the decentralization of discretion to
private groups is a good thing. Under the Ackerman-Hassler-Breyer
scheme, cartels rather like the old NIRA cartels may be making crucial
allocation decisions, and we have no more reason to trust those cartels
now than we did then." 3 Of course, Congress or the agencies might elimi-
nate the cartel problem by creating specialized sections within the agency
to assign particularized performance goals to individual firms. Such highly
particularized performance goals, however, might be as rigid and ineffi-
cient as command and process standards. The alternative is the market,
with the specialized agency sections assigning marketable entitlements or
duties to particular enterprises which in turn would buy and sell so as to
reach efficient solutions.13
Even if most implementation discretion can ultimately be returned to
the market, a great deal of discretion will probably remain in the process
of setting subgoals, time-staging them, and allocating them among various
enterprises. It is almost impossible to believe that such sub-allocation
could be done by agency fiat or by an internal agency "planning" process
that was purely discretionary. Sub-allocation would almost certainly re-
quire notice-and-comment rulemaking.13 Solving the problems caused by
132. See supra note 112.
133. Industry-wide targets could only be assigned to trade associations or ad hoc committees,
where the assignment of sub-targets to particular companies or plants might become the occasion for
anti-competitive maneuvers. See Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional
Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650, 708 (1975).
134. Various proposals for assigning marketable air and water pollution rights are examples. See,
e.g., Calvo y Gonzalez, Markets in Air: Problems and Prospects of Controlled Trading, 5 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 377 (1981); Note, Technology-Based Emission and Effluent Standards and the
Achievement of Ambient Environmental Objectives, 91 YALE L.J. 792 (1982).
135. The sub-allocation decisions would be so important to management and labor, as well as
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discretion may be possible only at the cost of suffering many of the rigidi-
ties and delays that now accompany rulemaking. This rulemaking process
would closely resemble the legislative process. Ultimately, Ackerman and
Hassler's call for agency discretion comes down to the belief, stated clearly
in their book,136 that the federal bureaucracy is a far better legislator than
is Congress. The Ackerman-Hassler-Breyer proposal, then, is not so much
a call for increasing administrative discretion as for shifting as much dis-
cretion as possible to individual enterprises under market constraints and
shifting lawmaking from statute-making in Congress to rulemaking in the
executive branch. If my prognostication about sub-allocations being done
by rulemaking is correct, then determining the value of the Ackerman-
Hassler proposal does not mean comparing the merits of rules to those of
discretion, but comparing the merits of statute-making to those of
rulemaking as an alternative legislative process. If Congress sets only
long-term, general goals, however, we are faced once again with the
problems raised in my discussion of thematic statutes.13 Faced with a
truly blank ends-forcing statute, courts will not easily be able to read in
thresholds or priorities. If courts therefore assign high burdens of proof to
agencies and require them to prove that their particular allocations will
meet Congressional targets, the rulemaking process will be further
rigidified.
To the extent that the agencies proceeding under ends-forcing statutes
can avoid rulemaking, a good deal of sub-allocation will probably be done
through negotiation. The problems with that form of discretion, are, as we
have seen, rather troubling.
Conclusion
I have noted that administrative law has entered a period in which the
two long-term tendencies that influence its development are pushing in
opposite directions. On the one hand, the courts are trying to catch up
with and limit agency discretion in the same way that they previously
harnessed agency adjudication and rulemaking. On the other, a reemerg-
ing respect for technocrats, accompanied by growing disillusionment with
interest group pluralist democracy, leaves judges in an increasingly poor
position to impose such rules. At the start of their great leap forward in
the 1960's, judges were not only lay heroes against the technocrats, but
consumers and local environmental interests, that they would all have a strong claim to the kind of
participation in decisionmaking that we have come to accommodate through notice-and-comment pro-
ceedings. See K. DAVIS, supra note 12, at 66 (notice-and-comment rulemaking is "most democratic of
procedures").
136. B. ACKEUIAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 39, at 116-21.
137. See supra pp. 1505-07.
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enforcers of the dominant group theory of democracy. By the 1970's,
courts were trying to cure the increasingly noted pathology of group poli-
tics by insisting that the rulemaker listen to and respond to every argu-
ment put forward by every group. By about 1980, courts required instead
that an agency consider all the facts and arguments that ought to be con-
sidered. 138 The former is an insistence that government submit itself to
democratic processes; the latter is an insistence that it act rationally or
scientifically. To make the latter demand, however, at a time when techni-
cians are regaining their ascendancy over laymen, is for judges a pecu-
liarly self-destructive stance: It places judicial review on precisely the
ground on which the judge-as-layman is particularly unqualified and the
technocrat is particularly qualified-the technical, scientific, and economic
correctness of the decisions reached by the agencies. Nor is this situation
static. As courts demand records that document synoptic decisionmaking,
the agencies will learn to present records of greater and greater complex-
ity. As courts are confronted with more and more technically complex
records, judges as lay heroes will seem to themselves, and appear to
others, less and less heroic. Thus, at a time when judges might be prepar-
ing to move into the next area of administrative practice to be legalized,
they may be feeling far less capable of judicial activism than they have felt
in the last few decades. The demand for synopticism is itself the greatest
attack on discretion, for it denies that discretion exists to choose any but a
single "right" answer. At the same time, an administrative record armored
in comprehensiveness is likely to be the best shield behind which agency
discretion can hide.
Given these cross-cutting tendencies, we need not expect a great judicial
crusade against discretion. Indeed, in certain areas, such as the discretion
entailed in regulatory negotiation and the setting and sub-specification of
general, long-term performance goals involved in the Ackerman-Hassler-
Breyer proposal, we might expect gains rather than losses for discretion.
In areas that combine high technology with high uncertainty, judges may
demand that agencies demonstrate that they have acted as synoptically as
possible, that agencies clearly identify areas of high uncertainty, and that
agencies give reasons for electing the strategies they do elect in the face of
that uncertainty. Such judicial demands will increase decisionmaking
costs, but ultimately will do little to curtail discretion. The more activist
judges will try to go further. We may expect some instances in which
judges employ statutory interpretation to undercut agency decisions with
which they disagree in their assignments of burdens of proof under condi-
tions of high uncertainty or in line-drawing situations.
138. See Diver, supra note 60, at 409-13.
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The area of waivers or exemptions is one I would put forth as a pro-
spective battleground. There seems likely to be increased interest in pri-
vate causes of action to challenge waivers, and increased judicial sensitivity
to pseudo-waivers leading to more demands that waivers be accomplished
through "hybrid" proceedings which involve relatively easy access to third
parties and approach full-scale adversary proceedings.
Thematic or lottery statutes, and the problems of the discretion that
accompany them, also seem unlikely to disappear. When a statute is genu-
inely underdetermined, there is no legitimate mode of judicial control over
agency discretion. It is difficult to predict the extent to which judges will
"cure" their institutional incapacity by resorting to statutory interpreta-
tions that set firm priorities in the face of congressional waffling. If I am
correct in predicting that the next few decades will witness some judicial
retreat as technocracy flourishes, we might not expect a major growth in
judicial control of this area of discretion.
It is in the first three areas of discretion I discussed-distributive deci-
sions; high-volume, low-level decisions; and subtle and complex assess-
ments of human characteristics-that I expect the thrust toward judicial
review of informal agency action to conflict most strongly with the con-
trary pressures set up by the resurgence of technocracy. In part through
the demand for substantive and procedural rules, and in part through re-
quirements that reasons be given, we are likely to see more restraint on
the kind of administrative discretion that flourishes when large numbers
of small distributive decisions requiring individualized judgments must be
made. Courts will place increasing pressure on agencies that defend dis-
cretion on the grounds of subtlety, complexity, and particularity of admin-
istrative decisions to prove that these agencies have the organization, per-
sonnel, and information necessary to make such decisions. Our new
electronic capacity for storing, retrieving, and analyzing millions of small
decisions has already resulted in demands that agencies follow their own
past decisions. Stricter requirements to follow precedent, rather than the
proliferation of procedural rules, may become the major vehicle for limit-
ing these areas of discretion over the next few years. If so, requirements
that reasons be given will also proliferate, both because reasoned opinions
are necessary for determining what counts as a precedent, and because the
only way to allow an agency flexibility under such a regime is to allow it
to deviate from precedent when it can give reasons for doing so.
It is distressingly clear to teachers of administrative law that they may
have no subject matter to teach, that administrative procedure may be de-
termined largely by the agency or even the policy involved. I certainly do
not expect a uniform judicial or congressional reaction to the many forms
of discretion. Particularly in high-technology areas, courts are likely to
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pause in any forward march toward limiting discretion. In other areas,
especially where large numbers of small claims involving common human
problems are central, the tendency for rules to catch up with administra-
tion is likely to continue.
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